Preference graphs: a combinatorial tool for game theory

Oliver Biggar and Iman Shames

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The preference graph is a combinatorial representation of the structure of a normal-form game. Its nodes are the strategy profiles, with an arc between profiles if they differ in the strategy of a single player, where the orientation indicates the preferred choice for that player. We show that the preference graph is a surprisingly fundamental tool for studying normal-form games, which arises from natural axioms and which underlies many key game-theoretic concepts, including dominated strategies and strict Nash equilibria, as well as classes of games like potential games, supermodular games and weakly acyclic games. The preference graph is especially related to game dynamics, playing a significant role in the behaviour of fictitious play and the replicator dynamic. Overall, we aim to equip game theorists with the tools and understanding to apply the preference graph to new problems in game theory.

Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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