Pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium in random games

Bary S. R. Pradelski and Bassel Tarbush

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We show that for any $\epsilon>0$ the probability that a randomly drawn game has a pure $\epsilon$-equilibrium goes to 1 as the number of agents gets large. This contrasts sharply with the known fact that if $\epsilon = 0$, that is, for pure Nash equilibrium, the probability is asymptotically $1- 1/e\approx 0.63$.

Date: 2025-02
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