Strategyproof Maximum Matching under Dichotomous Agent Preferences

Haris Aziz, Md. Shahidul Islam and Szilvia P\'apai

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching market design in which the agents are only interested in getting matched to an acceptable institution. These include centralized daycare assignment and healthcare rationing. We present a compelling new mechanism that satisfies many prominent and desirable properties including individual rationality, maximum size, fairness, Pareto-efficiency on both sides, strategyproofness on both sides, non-bossiness and having polynomial time running time. As a result, we answer an open problem whether there exists a mechanism that is agent-strategyproof, maximum, fair and non-bossy.

Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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