Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games

Fedor Sandomirskiy, Po Hyun Sung, Omer Tamuz and Ben Wincelberg

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Abstract: We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are responsive to payoffs induced by the play of others and, whenever several games are played simultaneously, players may consider each separately.

Date: 2025-02, Revised 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-rmg
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