Narrow Bracketing and Risk in Games

Fedor Sandomirskiy, Po Hyun Sung, Omer Tamuz and Ben Wincelberg

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Abstract: We study finite normal-form games under a narrow bracketing assumption: when players play several games simultaneously, they consider each one separately. We show that under mild additional assumptions, players must play either Nash equilibria, logit quantal response equilibria, or their generalizations, which capture players with various risk attitudes.

Date: 2025-02
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