The probability of satisfying axioms: a non-binary perspective on economic design

Pierre Bardier

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We provide a formal framework accounting for a widespread idea in the theory of economic design: analytically established incompatibilities between given axioms should be qualified by the likelihood of their violation. We define the degree to which rules satisfy an axiom, as well as several axioms, on the basis of a probability measure over the inputs of the rules. Armed with this notion of degree, we propose and characterize i) a criterion to evaluate and compare rules given a set of axioms, allowing the importance of each combination of axioms to differ, and ii) a criterion to measure the compatibility between given axioms, building on a analogy with cooperative game theory.

Date: 2025-02
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