Does Ideological Polarization Lead to Policy Polarization?

Philipp Denter

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study electoral competition between two ideologically polarized parties that are both office- and policy-motivated. Parties have fixed and opposing ideological positions but compete by choosing platforms on a second, continuous policy dimension. The analysis uncovers a non-monotonic relationship between ideological and policy polarization. When ideological polarization is low, an increase leads to policy moderation; when it is high, the opposite occurs, and policies become more extreme. Moreover, an electoral advantage shifts both parties' platforms toward the advantaged party's preferred policy, implying that the advantaged party adopts the more extreme position. More generally, both high- and low-valence candidates may adopt more extreme policies, depending on the electorate's degree of ideological polarization.

Date: 2025-02, Revised 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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