Managing Procurement Auction Failure: Bid Requirements or Reserve Prices

Jun Ma, Vadim Marmer () and Pai Xu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper examines bid requirements, where the government may cancel a procurement contract unless two or more bids are received. Using a first-price auction model with endogenous entry, we compare the bid requirement and reserve price mechanisms in terms of auction failure and procurement costs. We find that reserve prices result in lower procurement costs and substantially lower failure probabilities, especially when entry costs are high, or signals are sufficiently informative. Bid requirements are more likely to result in zero entry, while reserve prices can sustain positive entry under broader conditions.

Date: 2025-03
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