Value of Information in Social Learning

Hiroto Sato and Konan Shimizu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This study extends Blackwell's (1953) comparison of information to a sequential social learning model, where agents make decisions sequentially based on both private signals and the observed actions of others. In this context, we introduce a new binary relation over information structures: an information structure is more socially valuable than another if it yields higher expected payoffs for all agents, regardless of their preferences. First, we establish that this binary relation is strictly stronger than the Blackwell order. Then, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for our binary relation and propose a simpler sufficient condition that is easier to verify.

Date: 2025-03, Revised 2025-03
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