Bounds for within-household encouragement designs with interference

Santiago Acerenza, Julian Martinez-Iriarte, Alejandro S\'anchez-Becerra and Pietro Emilio Spini

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We obtain partial identification of direct and spillover effects in settings with strategic interaction and discrete treatments, outcome and independent instruments. We consider a framework with two decision-makers who play pure-strategy Nash equilibria in treatment take-up, whose outcomes are determined by their joint take-up decisions. We obtain a latent-type representation at the pair level. We enumerate all types that are consistent with pure-strategy Nash equilibria and exclusion restrictions, and then impose conditions such as symmetry, strategic complementarity/substitution, several notions of monotonicity, and homogeneity. Under any combination of the above restrictions, we provide sharp bounds for our parameters of interest via a simple Python optimization routine. Our framework allows the empirical researcher to tailor the above menu of assumptions to their empirical application and to assess their individual and joint identifying power.

Date: 2025-03
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