Regulating Ai In Financial Services: Legal Frameworks And Compliance Challenges

Shahmar Mirishli

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This article examines the evolving landscape of artificial intelligence (AI) regulation in financial services, detailing the legal frameworks and compliance challenges posed by rapid technological adoption. By reviewing current legislation, industry guidelines, and real-world use cases, it highlights how AI-driven processes, from fraud detection to algorithmic trading, offer efficiency gains yet introduce significant risks, including algorithmic bias, data privacy breaches, and lack of transparency in automated decision-making. The study compares regulatory approaches across major jurisdictions such as the European Union, United States, and United Kingdom, identifying both universal concerns, like the need for explainability and robust data protection, and region-specific compliance requirements that impact the implementation of high-risk AI applications. Additionally, it underscores emerging areas of focus, such as liability for AI-driven errors, systemic risks posed by interlinked AI systems, and the ethical considerations of technology-driven financial exclusion. The findings reveal gaps in existing rules and emphasize the necessity for adaptive, technology-neutral policies capable of fostering innovation while safeguarding consumer rights and market integrity. The article concludes by proposing a principled regulatory model that balances flexibility with enforceable standards, advocating closer collaboration between policymakers, financial institutions, and AI developers to ensure a secure, fair, and forward-looking framework for AI in finance.

Date: 2025-03
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