On Nash Equilibria in Play-Once and Terminal Deterministic Graphical Games

Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich and Kazuhisa Makino

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Abstract: We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position is a separate outcome. It is known that for $n=2$ such a game always has a Nash equilibrium, while that may not be true for $n > 2$. A game is called {\em play-once} if each player controls a unique position and {\em terminal} if any terminal outcome is better than the infinite one for each player. We prove in this paper that play-once games have Nash equilibria. We also show that terminal games have Nash equilibria if they have at most three terminals.

Date: 2025-03
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