Coordinated Shirking in Technology Adoption

Nicholas H. Tenev

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies a model of technology adoption: a principal tries to induce a group of agents to exert costly effort to vet a new production technology before they choose whether to use it. The principal finds it too costly to simultaneously punish large groups of unproductive agents, so they shirk when coordination is possible. Widely applicable technology expands productive possibilities but also provides an opportunity for coordinated shirking, and can thus lead to widespread production failure. Furthermore, even agents who learn that they are using flawed technology may continue to do so. Applications include mortgage securitization in the financial crisis of 2008, and the adoption of generative artificial intelligence.

Date: 2025-03
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