Equity in obviously strategy-proof exchange

Peng Liu and Huaxia Zeng

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We propose a novel hierarchy of merit-based fairness axioms for designing exchange rules: Equity under Acclaims (EA) => Equity under Bipartite Acclaims (EBA) => Weak Equity under Bipartite Acclaims (WEBA) => Equity under Unanimous Acclaims (EUA). With this hierarchy, we identify two unambiguous costs of strengthening strategy-proofness to obvious strategy-proofness. First, the applicability of obviously strategy-proof rules is narrowed: under a mild domain richness condition, an obviously strategy-proof rule satisfying EUA, the weakest fairness requirement in our hierarchy, exists if and only if preferences are single-peaked. By contrast, TTC, a strategy-proof rule under unrestricted preferences, satisfies our strongest fairness requirement, EA. Second, the level of attainable fairness is substantially reduced: we establish that no obviously strategy-proof rule satisfies EBA, whereas WEBA is attainable by a new obviously strategy-proof rule, Designator.

Date: 2025-04, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2504.05678 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2504.05678

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().