Maximum Implementable Improvements over Deferred Acceptance

Taylor Knipe and Josue Ortega

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Abstract: The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism produces stable but Pareto-inefficient school assignments. While mechanisms like Efficiency-Adjusted DA address this inefficiency by asking students to waive priorities at unattainable schools, they can leave significant gains unrealized-sometimes improving only two students when all but one could benefit. Surprisingly, such mechanisms can be doubly dominated, creating fewer improvements while generating more justified envy. We introduce the Maximum Implementable Improvement over the DA mechanism (MIIDA), which maximizes the number of students made better off given priority-waiving consents. MIIDA weakly Pareto dominates DA, is never doubly dominated, and incentivizes students to consent.

Date: 2025-04, Revised 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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