Reputational cheap talk: influentialness and welfare

Allen Vong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad class of signal structures and show that, when they exist, they are essentially unique. I show that informative equilibria can be noninfluential, in which case the receiver does not benefit from communication and relies only on prior information. My main results identify a complementarity that sufficiently precise prior information helps restore influential communication and characterize how the receiver's welfare depends on the quality of prior information. I also characterize how the sender's initial reputation for being informed shapes these results.

Date: 2025-05, Revised 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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