Comparison of Oracles

David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge by developing a theory of information loops.

Date: 2025-05, Revised 2025-05
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