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A Smart-Contract to Resolve Multiple Equilibrium in Intermediated Trade

Daniel Aronoff and Robert M. Townsend

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We construct an empirically founded model of a repo trade intermediated by two broker-dealers and prove multiple equilibrium and the existence of equilibrium at the joint profit maximizing volume of trade. We then present a smart contract that resolves multiple equilibrium by requiring each broker-dealer to report its client schedule and its minimum hurdle spread, and implementing a selection rule that filters out hurdle-infeasible outcomes. Whenever there exists an equilibrium that exceeds both hurdle spreads, the protocol selects the joint profit maximizing feasible trade and thereby avoids a collapse to no trade. The smart contract is a machine executed algorithm which eliminates the need for trust. Hardware and cryptography are used to prevent leakage of broker-dealer client trade schedules, and to enable privacy-protected auditing with zero-knowledge proofs of the integrity of computations. The outcome can be implemented by a myopic strategy where a broker-dealer truthfully reports its own variables without anticipating its counterparty's reports. This minimizes cognitive and computational complexity, thereby making our smart contract suitable for real-world deployment.

Date: 2025-05, Revised 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-pay
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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