Frictions and Welfare in Monopolistic Competition

Francesco Del Prato and Paolo Zacchia

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a heterogeneous firm economy with monopolistic competition, could informational asymmetries between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries sometimes improve welfare? We study this question by developing a model where banks finance entrepreneurs under asymmetric information. While aggregate productivity decreases with informational frictions, we find that welfare can be maximized at intermediate levels of information asymmetry due to a trade-off between productivity and product variety. Additionally, moderate input cost distortions can improve welfare when financial frictions are severe by offsetting the resulting weak firm selection.

Date: 2025-05
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