A House Monotonic and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method

Ross Hyman

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A Ranked candidate voting methods based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable Vote. It also complies with house monotonicity and independence of irrelevant ballots, properties that are the ranked-candidate analogs of the divisor methods properties of always avoiding the Alabama and New State paradoxes. The highest ranked candidate in the list is the Instant Runoff winner, which is in at least one Droop proportional set of N winners for all N.

Date: 2025-06
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