A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method

Ross Hyman

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A proportional ranked candidate voting method is described that satisfies ranked candidate analogs of the voting criteria satisfied by Phragmen's approval voting procedure. The method complies with Droop proportionality, house monotonicity, and coherence. The last two properties are the ranked-candidate analogs of the divisor method properties of always avoiding the Alabama and New State paradoxes. The method is free rider resistant and adding a candidate to each ballot that is universally preferred to all other candidates does not alter the relative winning order of the other candidates. The highest ranked candidate in the list is the Instant Runoff winner, which is shown to be in at least one Droop proportional set of N winners for all N, giving a quantitative meaning to the notion that the Instant Runoff winner has both core and broad voter support.

Date: 2025-06, Revised 2026-10
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