Who and How? Adverse Selection and flexible Moral Hazard

Henrique Castro-Pires, Deniz Kattwinkel and Jan Knoepfle

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We characterize the set of incentive compatible mechanisms in problems with hidden productivity types and flexible hidden actions. We demonstrate the tractability of the characterization with applications.

Date: 2025-06
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