Smart contracts and reaction-function games

Jens Gudmundsson and Jens Leth Hougaard

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Blockchain-based smart contracts offer a new take on credible commitment, where players can commit to actions in reaction to actions of others. Such reaction-function games extend on strategic games with players choosing reaction functions instead of strategies. We formalize a solution concept in terms of fixed points for such games, akin to Nash equilibrium, and prove equilibrium existence. Reaction functions can mimic "trigger" strategies from folk theorems on infinitely repeated games -- but now in a one-shot setting. We introduce a refinement in terms of safe play. We apply our theoretical framework to symmetric investment games, which includes two prominent classes of games, namely weakest-link and public-good games. In both cases, we identify a safe and optimal reaction function. In this way, our findings highlight how blockchain-based commitment can overcome trust and free-riding barriers.

Date: 2025-06
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