Minimal Stable Voting Rules

H\'ector Hermida-Rivera

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties have evolved to ensure the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions.

Date: 2025-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.15323 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2506.15323

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().