Network Heterogeneity and Value of Information

Kota Murayama

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Does greater connectivity enhance the value of public information? I study a networked beauty contest game where agents balance adaptation to the fundamental with local coordination. The analysis reveals a stark non-monotonicity: while public disclosure improves welfare when interactions are uniform, regardless of their intensity, it can be detrimental in core-periphery structures. This welfare loss stems from a distortion driven by the core, where core agents over-respond to a noisy public signal, forcing peripheral neighbors to absorb this volatility to maintain alignment. These findings suggest that standard transparency policies can backfire in tiered markets where dominant hubs propagate excess volatility.

Date: 2025-06, Revised 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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