Duality and Policy Evaluation in Distributionally Robust Bayesian Diffusion Control

Jose Blanchet, Jiayi Cheng, Hao Liu and Yang Liu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a Bayesian diffusion control problem of expected terminal utility maximization. The controller imposes a prior distribution on the unknown drift of an underlying diffusion. The Bayesian optimal control, tracking the posterior distribution of the unknown drift, can be characterized explicitly. However, in practice, the prior will generally be incorrectly specified, and the degree of model misspecification can have a significant impact on policy performance. To mitigate this and reduce overpessimism, we introduce a distributionally robust Bayesian control (DRBC) formulation in which the controller plays a game against an adversary who selects a prior in divergence neighborhood of a baseline prior. The adversarial approach has been studied in economics and efficient algorithms have been proposed in static optimization settings. We develop a strong duality result for our DRBC formulation. Combining these results together with tools from stochastic analysis, we are able to derive a loss that can be efficiently trained (as we demonstrate in our numerical experiments) using a suitable neural network architecture. As a result, we obtain an effective algorithm for computing the DRBC optimal strategy. The methodology for computing the DRBC optimal strategy is greatly simplified, as we show, in the important case in which the adversary chooses a prior from a Kullback-Leibler distributional uncertainty set.

Date: 2025-06, Revised 2025-06
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