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Asymptotic Equilibrium Analysis of the Boston Mechanism

Josue Ortega

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Abstract: We analyze the performance of the Boston mechanism under equilibrium play in uniform random markets. We provide two results. First, while the share of students assigned to their first preference is 63% under truthfulness, this fraction becomes vanishingly small in any Nash equilibrium of the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism. Second, we show that there is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game where the average student is assigned to a highly undesirable school-dramatically worse ranked than the logarithmic rank achieved under truthfulness.

Date: 2025-06
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