A Note on the Strategic Vulnerability of the Boston Mechanism in Random Markets

Josue Ortega

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63\% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting-outperforming any other known mechanism in the literature-this rate converges to zero in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game as the market size grows. Second, we show there exists a Nash equilibrium where the average student receives a dramatically inferior assignment: in markets with 1,000 students, the average placement shifts from the 7th choice (under truthfulness) to the 145th choice, representing a change from logarithmic to nearly linear average rank.

Date: 2025-06, Revised 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in Soc Choice Welf (2026)

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