Optimal Benchmark Design under Costly Manipulation

\'Angel Hernando-Veciana

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Price benchmarks are used to incorporate market price trends into contracts, but their use can create opportunities for manipulation by parties involved in the contract. This paper examines this issue using a realistic and tractable model inspired by smart contracts on blockchains like Ethereum. In our model, manipulation costs depend on two factors: the magnitude of adjustments to individual prices (variable costs) and the number of prices adjusted (fixed costs). We find that a weighted mean is the optimal benchmark when fixed costs are negligible, while the median is optimal when variable costs are negligible. In cases where both fixed and variable costs are significant, the optimal benchmark can be implemented as a trimmed mean, with the degree of trimming increasing as fixed costs become more important relative to variable costs. Furthermore, we show that the optimal weights for a mean-based benchmark are proportional to the marginal manipulation costs, whereas the median remains optimal without weighting, even when fixed costs differ across prices.

Date: 2025-06
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