A contemporary approach on revisited cost allocation using airport games: the effects of code-sharing

Alejandro Saavedra-Nieves and M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro

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Abstract: An important operational aspect in airport management is the allocation of fees to aircraft movements on a runway, whether operated by separate operators or under code-sharing agreements. This paper analyses the problem of determining fees under code-sharing of the movements at an airport from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we propose the configuration value for games with coalition configuration as the mechanism for allocating operating costs. We provide the exact expression of this game-theoretic solution for airport games, which depends only on the parameters of the associated airport problem. For this purpose, we consider a new and natural game-theoretic characterization of the configuration value. Finally, for the specific context of airport games, we apply it to a real case as a mechanism to determine the aircraft fees at a Spanish airport in a code-sharing scenario.

Date: 2025-06
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