Stability in Many-to-One Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences

Shashwat Khare, Souvik Roy and Ton Storcken

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Abstract: This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a stable matching may fail to exist even when both couples and institutions have responsive preferences. Next, we provide conditions on couples' preferences that are necessary and sufficient to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where institutions may have any responsive preference. Finally, we do the same with respect to institutions' preferences, that is, we provide conditions on institutions' preferences that are necessary and sufficient to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where couples may have any responsive preference.

Date: 2025-07
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