Luck Out or Outpay? Competing with a Public Option

Teddy Mekonnen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper analyzes the strategic interactions between a profit-maximizing monopolist and a free, capacity-constrained public option. By restricting its own supply, the monopolist intentionally congests the public option and induces rationing, which increases consumers' willingness to pay for guaranteed access. Counterintuitively, expanding the public option's capacity may raise the monopoly price and lower consumer welfare. However, I derive conditions under which all buyer types benefit from a capacity expansion, and extend these results to a setting where an oligopoly competes with a public option. These findings have implications for mixed public-private markets, such as housing, education, and healthcare.

Date: 2025-07, Revised 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
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