Strategic Complexity Promotes Egalitarianism in Legislative Bargaining

Marina Agranov, S. Nageeb Ali, B. Douglas Bernheim and Thomas R. Palfrey

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Strategic models of legislative bargaining predict that proposers can extract high shares of economic surplus by identifying and exploiting weak coalition partners. However, strength and weakness can be difficult to assess even with relatively simple bargaining protocols. We evaluate experimentally how strategic complexity affects the ability to identify weak coalition partners, and for the partners themselves to determine whether their positions are weak or strong. We find that, as strategic complexity progressively obscures bargaining strength, proposers migrate to egalitarianism, in significant part because non-proposers begin placing substantial weight on fairness. Greater analytic skill dampens but does not eliminate these patterns.

Date: 2025-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2507.15682 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2507.15682

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().