Quotas for scholarship recipients: an efficient race-neutral alternative to affirmative action?

Louis Gleyo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Since 2018, France's centralized higher education platform, Parcoursup, has implemented quotas for scholarship recipients, with program-specific thresholds based on the applicant's composition. Using difference-in-differences methods, I find these quotas enabled scholarship students to access more selective programs, though intention-to-treat effects remain modest (maximum 0.10 SD). Matching methods reveal that the policy improved the scholarship students' waiting list positions relative to those of comparable non-scholarship peers. However, I detect no robust or lasting effects on the extensive margin of higher education access. Despite high policy salience, quotas did not affect the application behavior or pre-college investment of scholarship students, even among high achievers. These findings align with research on affirmative action bans, suggesting that such policies primarily benefit disadvantaged students who access selective institutions, rather than expanding total enrollment. Nevertheless, scholarship quotas demonstrate that race-neutral alternatives can effectively promote socioeconomic diversity in prestigious programs.

Date: 2025-07
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