Aligning Large Language Model Agents with Rational and Moral Preferences: A Supervised Fine-Tuning Approach

Wei Lu, Amit Dhanda, Daniel L. Chen and Christian B. Hansen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents in markets and organizations, their behavior in strategic environments becomes economically consequential. We document that off-the-shelf LLM agents exhibit systematic deviations from payoff-sensitive behavior in canonical economic games, including excessive cooperation and limited responsiveness to incentives. We introduce a supervised fine-tuning approach that aligns agent behavior with explicit economic preferences. Specifically, we generate optimal strategies under two stylized utility specifications, homo economicus, which maximizes self-interest, and homo moralis, which incorporates Kantian universalizability, and use these utility-implied reasoning and strategies to guide fine-tuning. Fine-tuning on a small, theory-driven synthetic dataset induces persistent and interpretable shifts in strategic behavior. In applications to moral dilemmas and repeated duopoly pricing, agents aligned to different preference structures produce systematically distinct equilibrium outcomes and pricing dynamics. These results frame AI alignment in multi-agent settings as an objective-design problem and illustrate how economic theory can guide the design of strategically coherent AI agents.

Date: 2025-07, Revised 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain, nep-big, nep-cmp and nep-upt
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