Optimal Transfer Mechanism for Municipal Soft-Budget Constraints in Newfoundland
Xinli Guo
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
Newfoundland and Labrador's municipalities face severe soft budget pressures due to narrow tax bases, high fixed service costs, and volatile resource revenues. We develop a Stackelberg style mechanism design model in which the province commits at t = 0 to an ex ante grant schedule and an ex post bailout rule. Municipalities privately observe their fiscal need type, choose effort, investment, and debt, and may receive bailouts when deficits exceed a statutory threshold. Under convexity and single crossing, the problem reduces to one dimensional screening and admits a tractable transfer mechanism with quadratic bailout costs and a statutory cap. The optimal ex ante rule is threshold-cap; under discretionary rescue at t = 2, it becomes threshold-linear-cap. A knife-edge inequality yields a self-consistent no bailout regime, and an explicit discount factor threshold renders hard budgets dynamically credible. We emphasize a class of monotone threshold signal rules; under this class, grant crowd out is null almost everywhere, which justifies the constant grant weight used in closed form expressions. The closed form characterization provides a policy template that maps to Newfoundland's institutions and clarifies the micro-data required for future calibration.
Date: 2025-08, Revised 2025-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2508.02171
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