Coordinating cooperation in stag-hunt game: Emergence of evolutionarily stable procedural rationality

Joy Das Bairagya and Sagar Chakraborty

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals are rational). In line with the fact the humans strive for developing self-reputation by having less propensity to cheat than to be cheated, we observe that the payoff structure of the stag-hunt game appropriately modifies to that of coordination-II game. Subsequently, within the paradigm of evolutionary game theory, we establish that a population -- consisting of procedural rational players (a type of bounded rationality) -- is unequivocally evolutionarily stable against emergence of more rational strategies in coordination-II game. The cooperation is, thus, shown to have been established by evolutionary forces picking less rational individuals.

Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in J. Phys. Complex. 6, 035004 (2025)

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