Collateral and Reputation in a Model of Strategic Defaults

Georgy Lukyanov

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper builds a finite-horizon model to study the role of physical collateral in a model of strategic defaults, when the borrower can develop reputation for honesty. Asset ownership increases attractiveness of the reputational channel: the borrower who would prefer to remain in autarky in the absence of the asset prefers to apply for collateralized debt. Pledging the asset as collateral facilitates reputation building, which is especially successful at the times of asset price drops, because these are the times when default is most tempting. The complementarity between secured and unsecured lending is especially pronounced when the ratio of the borrower's financial to non-financial income is neither too large nor too small.

Date: 2025-09
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Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 156 (2023) 104755

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