Causal PDE-Control Models for Dynamic Portfolio Optimization with Latent Drivers
Alejandro Rodriguez Dominguez
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
Classical portfolio models degrade under structural breaks, whereas flexible machine-learning allocation methods often lack arbitrage consistency and interpretability. We propose Causal PDE-Control Models (CPCMs), a framework that integrates structural causal drivers, nonlinear filtering, and forward-backward PDE control to produce robust and transparent allocation rules under partial information. We construct driver-conditional risk-neutral measures on the observable filtration via filtering together with the corresponding martingale representation, linking pricing, hedging, and portfolio choice under a common information set. We further establish a projection-divergence duality showing that restricting portfolios to the causal driver span selects the feasible allocation closest to the unconstrained optimum under a convex divergence, thereby quantifying the stability cost of deviations from the causal manifold, and derive a causal completeness condition identifying when a finite driver span captures systematic premia. Markowitz, CAPM/APT, and Black-Litterman arise as limiting cases, while reinforcement learning and deep hedging appear as unconstrained approximations within the same pricing-control geometry. Empirically, on a U.S.equity panel with more than 300 candidate drivers, CPCM solvers achieve higher Sharpe ratios, lower turnover, and more persistent premia than econometric and machine-learning benchmarks.
Date: 2025-09, Revised 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.09585 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2509.09585
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().