A Simple Characterization of Qualified Majority Voting Rules

H\'ector Hermida-Rivera

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Abstract: This paper characterizes every qualified majority voting rule with a quota $q$ strictly greater than half of the voter set in environments with just two alternatives through anonymity, responsiveness, and $q$-neutrality. Crucially, the latter imposes independence of the labels of the alternatives only for all preference profiles in which some alternative is strictly top-ranked by at least $q$ voters. Thus, this paper generalizes May's (1952, Theorem, p. 682) characterization of the simple majority voting rule to qualified majority voting rules with a quota $q$ strictly greater than half of the voter set. In doing so, it shows that these qualified majority voting rules are distinguished by their degree of neutrality.

Date: 2025-09, Revised 2025-10
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