A Note on Qualified Majority Voting Rules

Héctor Hermida-Rivera

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This note characterizes every qualified majority voting rule in environments with just two alternatives through anonymity, responsiveness, and q-neutrality. Crucially, the latter imposes independence of the labels of the alternatives if and only if some alternative is strictly top-ranked by at least q voters. Thus, this note generalizes May's (1952, Theorem, p. 682) characterization of the simple majority voting rule to qualified majority voting rules. In doing so, it shows that qualified majority voting rules are distinguished by their degree of neutrality.

Date: 2025-09, Revised 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.19823 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2509.19823

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().