Optimal bidding in multiperiod day-ahead electricity markets assuming non-uniform uncertainty of clearing prices

D\'avid Csercsik and Mih\'aly Andr\'as V\'aghy

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a recent publication, using a simple two-period model, which is already capable to capture essential non-convex multiperiod bids, Richstein et al. have shown that in the case of optimal bidding, multi-part bidding always ensures a higher expected profit for the bidder, compared to simple bidding and block-bidding. The model proposed in their analysis assumes a uniform distribution of the market-clearing prices in both periods. In this paper, we study how the conclusions of the analysis are affected, if a very simple, symmetric, stepwise-constant but non-uniform distribution is assumed in the case of the market-clearing price. We show that the results of Richstein et al. also hold in this case.

Date: 2025-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.07025 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2510.07025

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().