Correlated Perfect Equilibrium

Wanying Huang, J. Jude Kline and Priscilla Man

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Abstract: We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE never assigns positive probability to any weakly dominated strategy. We provide a dual representation of CPE and demonstrate how it differs from two existing refinements of correlated equilibrium--acceptable correlated equilibrium (Myerson, 1986) and perfect direct correlated equilibrium (Dhillon-Mertens, 1996)--through examples.

Date: 2025-10
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