Strategic Behavior in Crowdfunding: Insights from a Large-Scale Online Experiment

Din Amir, Bar Hoter and Moran Koren

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This study examines strategic behavior in crowdfunding using a large-scale online experiment. Building on the model of Arieli et. al 2023, we test predictions about risk aversion (i.e., opting out despite seeing a positive private signal) and mutual insurance (i.e., opting in despite seeing a negative private signal) in a static, single-shot crowdfunding game, focusing on informational incentives rather than dynamic effects. Our results validate key theoretical predictions: crowdfunding mechanisms induce distinct strategic behaviors compared to voting, where participants are more likely to follow private signals (odds ratio: 0.139, $p

Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.14872 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2510.14872

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().