Do Test Scores Help Teachers Give Better Track Advice to Students? A Principal Stratification Analysis

Andrea Ichino, Fabrizia Mealli () and Javier Viviens

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Every year, over one million EU students choose a secondary school track based on teacher recommendations, yet little evidence shows this yields optimal assignments. Using Dutch data, we examine whether access to standardized test scores improves recommendation quality. We develop a Principal-Stratification metric in a quasi-randomized setting, conduct a welfare analysis that flexibly weights short- and long-term losses, and assess principal fairness by examining whether test-score access affects equity across protected attributes. Results are robust to replacing the Exclusion Restriction assumption underlying our main identification strategy with alternative assumptions. Allowing recommendation upgrades when test scores exceed expectations increases successful placement in more demanding tracks by at least 6%, while misplacing 7% of weaker students. Only unrealistically high weights on short-term losses would justify banning such upgrades. Test-score access also yields fairer recommendations for immigrant and low-SES students. Our methodology and findings contribute to the literature on algorithm-assisted human decisions.

Date: 2025-11, Revised 2026-02
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