Worker Selection and Efficiency

Yonghang Ji and Allen Vong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a model where a manager repeatedly selects one worker from a group of homogeneous workers to perform a task. We characterize the largest set of parameters under which an equilibrium achieving efficient worker performance exists. We then show that this is the set of parameters given which the following manager's strategy constitutes an efficient equilibrium: the manager cyclically orders all workers and if the task is undesirable (resp., desirable), a worker is selected until good (resp., bad) performance, after which the manager randomizes between reselecting him and moving to the next worker; the reselection probability is set to be as high as effort incentives permit. Our findings extend to repeated selection of multiple workers.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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