Task assignment as dynamic incentives

Yonghang Ji and Allen Vong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study repeated assignment of a task among workers as an incentive instrument for effort. Unlike traditional instruments, task assignment is inseparable from production and rivalrous: it both provides incentives and determines who produces, while necessarily excluding others. We show that workers are optimally assigned the task through a strict, evolving priority ranking. In every continuation, workers' expected average workloads differ, even when they are technologically independent and symmetric in all aspects. Consequently, our results highlight that the efficiency-equality tension is more pervasive than previously recognized. We further examine design instruments that expand the scope of efficiency without aggravating worker inequality.\bigskip

Date: 2025-11, Revised 2026-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2511.05338 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2511.05338

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().