The Value of a Chance: Task Concentration and Talent Discovery in Team Production

Masaya Nishihata

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Organizations often concentrate scarce, high-value tasks on proven performers, but doing so may limit opportunities to develop and learn about alternative workers. We study this trade-off using temporary injuries to high-performing Major League Baseball players, which generate plausibly exogenous reallocations of playing opportunities. Tracking allocation and performance before, during, and after these absences, we find clear evidence of crowd-out: when a high performer becomes unavailable, same-team, same-position coworkers receive substantially more opportunities. Yet we find little evidence that the additional experience raises batting productivity during the absence or after the high performer returns, suggesting that learning by doing is not the main dynamic benefit. Instead, performance surprises during the absence predict subsequent employment and playing opportunities, consistent with teams using newly revealed information in later allocation decisions. Counterfactual exercises further suggest that the information generated by temporary reallocations can have positive future production value when it changes subsequent allocation, partially offsetting short-run production losses in some cases. The results highlight a general organizational trade-off: concentrating important tasks on known high performers can protect current output while slowing the discovery of capable alternatives.

Date: 2025-11, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul, nep-hrm and nep-spo
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