Individualized Algorithmic Advice as a Strategic Signal on Competitive Markets

Tobias R. Rebholz, Maxwell Uphoff, Christian H. R. Bernges and Florian Scholten

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: As algorithms increasingly mediate competitive decision-making, their influence extends beyond individual outcomes to shaping strategic market dynamics. In our experiment, we examined how algorithmic advice affects human behavior in a classic economic game with a unique, non-collusive, and analytically traceable equilibrium. Participants (N = 129) played a Cournot quantity competition with equilibrium-aligned or strategically biased algorithmic recommendations. While individualized equilibrium advice supported stable convergence, collusively downward-biased advice led to sustained underproduction and supracompetitive profits - hallmarks of tacit collusion. Participants' quantities converged faster and more consistently toward individualized than collective equilibrium advice, potentially due to an objective quality advantage or greater perceived ownership of the former. These findings demonstrate that algorithmic advice can function as a strategic signal, shaping coordination even without explicit communication. The results echo real-world concerns about algorithmic collusion and underscore the need for careful design and oversight of algorithmic decision-support systems in competitive environments.

Date: 2025-11, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain, nep-com and nep-exp
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