Non-symmetric discrete Colonel Blotto game

Marcin Dziubi\'nski

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study equilibrium strategies and the value of the asymmetric variant of the discrete Colonel Blotto game with $K \geq 2$ battlefields, $B \geq 1$ resources of the weaker player and $A > B$ resources of the stronger player. We derive equilibrium strategies and the formulas for the value of the game for the cases where the number of resources of the weaker player, $B$, is at least $2(\lceil A/K \rceil - 1)$ as well as for the cases where this number is at most $\lfloor A/K \rfloor$. In particular, we solve all the cases of the game which can be solved using the discrete General Lotto game of~\cite{Hart08}. We propose a constrained variant of the discrete General Lotto game and use it to derive equilibrium strategies in the discrete Colonel Blotto game, that go beyond the General Lotto solvable cases game.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-spo
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