Delegation and Lobbying

Thomas Groll and Sharyn O'Halloran

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This chapter examines the link between delegation and lobbying, two themes central to political economy. Delegation models explore how legislatures manage uncertainty and control bureaucratic agents, while lobbying models analyze how organized interests influence policy through contributions, information, and advocacy. We review the growing body of research that integrates these literatures, showing how the prospect of lobbying affects legislative incentives to delegate and how the structure of delegated authority shapes lobbying strategies. We highlight common-agency frameworks that capture the recursive relationship between delegation and lobbying and empirical studies documenting how venue choice, information provision, and interest group mobilization mediate delegation outcomes. We also review applications to agency oversight and fiscal policy. Finally, we present a model of regulatory rule-making that embeds lobbying directly into the delegation decision, offering predictions for both theory and empirical analysis.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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