Identification Design

Maxwell Rosenthal

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper introduces a model of identification design in which the decision maker observes the population distribution of signals generated by an information structure and ranks actions by their worst-case payoff over the admissible state distributions consistent with those signals. The environment is manipulable if every action is implementable under every admissible distribution of the state variable, and strongly so if this is achievable via almost fully informative information structures that conceal at most one dimension of information from the decision maker. We show that manipulability holds if and only if every action has the same worst-case payoff if and only if strong manipulability holds. In our main application to robust causal inference in econometrics, we verify that treatment-effects models satisfy both manipulability criteria. More broadly, we provide a complete characterization of the set of implementable actions for all non-manipulable environments in which the decision maker's underlying payoffs are of the expected utility form and the set of admissible state distributions is compact and convex.

Date: 2025-11, Revised 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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