Discrete Choice with Endogenous Peer Selection

Nail Kashaev and Natalia Lazzati

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop a continuous-time peer-effect discrete choice model where peers that affect the preferences of a given agent are randomly selected based on their previous choices. We characterize the equilibrium behavior and study the empirical content of the model. In the model, changes in the choices of peers affect both the set of peers the agent pays attention to and her preferences over the alternatives. We exploit variation in choices coupled with variation in the size of the set of potential peers to recover agents' preferences and the peer selection mechanism. These nonparametric identification results do not rely on exogenous variation of covariates.

Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
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