Optimizing Information Asset Investment Strategies in the Exploratory Phase of the Oil and Gas Industry: A Reinforcement Learning Approach
Paulo Roberto de Melo Barros Junior,
Monica Alexandra Vilar Ribeiro De Meireles and
Jose Luis Lima de Jesus Silva
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
Our work investigates the economic efficiency of the prevailing "ladder-step" investment strategy in oil and gas exploration, which advocates for the incremental acquisition of geological information throughout the project lifecycle. By employing a multi-agent Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) framework, we model an alternative strategy that prioritizes the early acquisition of high-quality information assets. We simulate the entire upstream value chain-comprising competitive bidding, exploration, and development phases-to evaluate the economic impact of this approach relative to traditional methods. Our results demonstrate that front-loading information investment significantly reduces the costs associated with redundant data acquisition and enhances the precision of reserve valuation. Specifically, we find that the alternative strategy outperforms traditional methods in highly competitive environments by mitigating the "winner's curse" through more accurate bidding. Furthermore, the economic benefits are most pronounced during the development phase, where superior data quality minimizes capital misallocation. These findings suggest that optimal investment timing is structurally dependent on market competition rather than solely on price volatility, offering a new paradigm for capital allocation in extractive industries.
Date: 2025-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2512.00243
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