Computing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Imperfect-Information Games

Sam Ganzfried

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric two-player perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. The algorithm operates directly in sequence form, avoiding explicit enumeration of normal-form supports. In a biologically motivated cancer signaling game, the algorithm recovers all seven symmetric Nash equilibria and identifies all three ESSs, each with a clear biological interpretation. Experiments on random imperfect-information games evaluate scalability as the numbers of private signals and available actions increase.

Date: 2025-12, Revised 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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